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The Identical Rivals Response to 
Underdetermination 
By Greg Frost-Arnold and P.D. Magnus 
published as pages 112-130 of New Waves in Philosophy of Science, 
P.D. Magnus and Jacob Busch (eds.) Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
 
The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, 
inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide 
responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be 
underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct 
theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations 
of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals 
response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the 
response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from 
Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin suggests that the response is never 
appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general 
theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical 
rivals response; since Einstein’s arguments are generally accepted, the 
response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate?  
We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton’s view and that of 
Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when 
there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in 
simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any 
ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it 
typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as 
  
mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these 
would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable 
way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there 
is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is 
appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest 
for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them.  
1  Responding to underdetermination 
Consider a prima facie case of underdetermination: There seem to 
be two theories T1 and T2 such that standards of responsible theory 
choice preclude deciding between them. If we accept that the case is as 
it seems, then we must decide what to do about T1 and T2. A modest 
agnostic response is to suspend judgment. If our actions depend on the 
difference between them, then we muddle along in our uncertainty. A 
more bumptious response— call this fideism— is to believe one of the 
two theories anyway, as an article of faith.1  
Of course, since this is only an apparent case of 
underdetermination, we might instead try to show that the choice is not 
really underdetermined at all. There are again two possibilities. We 
might deny that responsible choice between the two is impossible. If 
we tinker with the standards of theory choice, then there might be 
grounds to prefer one or the other. This is a standard gambit of realists, 
who add simplicity, novel prediction, or explanatory power to the 
                                                
1Regarding fideism, see Magnus (2005a) and also van Fraasen 
(2002). 
  
standards that guide theory choice. To highlight the contrast with 
agnosticism, call this the gnostic response. 
Alternately, we might deny that there really are two rival theories 
under consideration. This might seem as bumptious a response as 
fideism, but it need not be. Imagine, for example, that T1 is a theory in 
French and that T2 is its German translation; that T1 is a theory 
expressed in the metric system and that the only difference in T2 is that 
values are converted to imperial units; or that T1 is formulated using 
Cartesian coördinates and that T2 expresses equivalent claims using 
polar coördinates. Surely, standards of responsible theory choice will 
be insufficient to prefer one over the other with any of these three pairs. 
Within each pair, both of the options are the selfsame theory!  One 
merits belief just if the other does. There really is no 
underdetermination at all. We might reply to any apparent case of 
underdetermination by insisting that the alleged rivals are really just 
different formulations of the same theory. Call this the identical rivals 
response. 
These four responses form a matrix; see figure 1.2 
                                                
2Sklar (1974, ch 2) and Gardner (1976) offer a similar assessment 
of the options. 
  
 
 We do not decide 
between T1 and T2. 
We do decide between 
T1 and T2. 
The case is judged to 
be underdetermined. 
agnostic response fideist response 
The case is judged not 
to be underdetermined. 
identical rivals 
response 
gnostic response 
fig. 1: Four responses to would-be underdetermination  
 
For positivists, the identical rivals response is always the right one: 
Any two theories which cannot be distinguished on observational 
grounds have the same meaning and so are the same theory. Positivism 
runs into familiar difficulties— and there are probably no positivists 
among our readers, anyway— so we set that answer aside. What we 
want to know is, under what circumstances is the identical rivals 
response appropriate?  
The obvious answer is: when the two theories really are identical. 
The difficult and interesting question is, rather, what counts as good 
evidence for the identity of two apparently inconsistent but 
observationally equivalent theories?  Put otherwise, what sorts of 
considerations would lead one to view two such theories as identical?  
We propose to come at this difficult question in a roundabout way. In 
the next section, we consider famous Einsteinian arguments that make 
use of the identical rivals response (§2). These examples show that the 
response is appropriate in at least some cases. Moreover (as we discuss 
in §§3–4) they indicate that the identical rivals response goes naturally 
  
with a parsimonious ontology. We argue further: The identical rivals 
response is really only tenable in cases where a parsimonious ontology 
is tenable. In §5, we use this connection to provide some criteria for 
when the identical rivals response is appropriate. 
2  Two examples from Einstein 
Einstein employs what is recognizably the identical rivals response 
in formulating both the special and general theories of relativity. The 
same inferential pattern appears in his 1905 special relativity paper and 
reappears, applied to different subject matter, in his justification of the 
principle of equivalence, one of the essential steps on the intellectual 
road to general relativity. 
Einstein (1905/1952) claims that Maxwell’s electrodynamics 
suffers from certain faults. He presents these faults via the now-famous 
example of a magnet and a conductor moving relative to one another. If 
the magnet is regarded as moving and the conductor as being at rest, 
Maxwell’s theory claims that an electric field with a certain energy will 
come into existence around the magnet, which produces an observable 
current in parts of the conductor. However, if the magnet is regarded as 
being at rest and the conductor as moving, then there is no electric field 
in the neighborhood of the magnet. Instead, an electromotive force is 
created in the conductor. This electromotive force gives rise to the very 
same current in the conductor as in the first case. If we move with the 
magnet, we say that an electrical field is produced around the magnet; 
if we move with the conductor, we say an electromotive force is 
produced in the conductor. In both cases, however, the current running 
though the conductor is the same; if we connected an ammeter to the 
  
conductor, we would measure the same value for the current in both 
cases. Einstein draws the following moral from these two cases: 
“Maxwell’s electrodynamics... when applied to moving bodies, leads to 
asymmetries which do not appear in the phenomena” (1905/1952,  37). 
Let T1 be the description according to which the magnet is in 
motion and the conductor is at rest; let T2 be the description according 
to which the conductor is in motion and the magnet is at rest. T1 and T2 
make the same predictions for all observable phenomena. We have a 
prima facie case of underdetermination. 
In a similar case, Galileo counseled an agnostic response. In his 
famous discussion of a moving boat, Galileo concludes that the people 
below decks cannot tell whether they are in motion or not— it is ‘as if’ 
the people are at rest (1967, 116). Given two bodies in relative motion, 
Galileo would have said, there is a fact of the matter about whether one 
of them is at rest or not— even though no local appearances could 
allow us to determine which of the two is moving. In this case there is a 
genuine agnostic response to putative underdetermination; it is not 
merely a conceptual possibility marked out in figure 1. 
Yet Einstein does not give Galileo’s agnostic response. Rather, he 
concludes that T1 and T2 are just different descriptions of the same 
situation. Although a orthodox physicist in 1905 would think that either 
the magnet or the conductor was in true motion, the supposed 
difference between two descriptions is illusory. In short, Einstein gives 
the identical rivals response. 
Einstein deploys the identical rivals response when arguing for the 
general theory of relativity as well.  His reasoning is especially clear in 
  
the first general relativity seminar he teaches, in the summer semester 
of 1919 in Berlin. Hans Reichenbach attended this seminar, and his 
notebook contains formulations of Einstein’s that bring out the parallels 
to the 1905 paper. Early in the term, Einstein states that both classical 
mechanics and the special theory of relativity suffer from a certain 
“physical deficiency.” Both rely on the natural law that gravitational 
mass equals inertial mass, which has been confirmed “with very great, 
astounding exactness” (1919, I.3). Nevertheless, classical mechanics 
must take the equality as a brute fact and consequently “there is no 
explanation for... [this] most important law of nature.” As Einstein sees 
it, though, “we want the numerical equality reduced to an essential 
equality” (1919, I.4). Einstein accounts for this equality by the so-
called principle of equivalence.3  
Einstein considers two frames of reference. The first frame is 
inertial, i.e. it has zero acceleration in all three spatial dimensions, but 
has a homogeneous gravitational field of strength g directed along the 
                                                
3Einstein expresses this idea in print. He writes that “previous 
mechanics had indeed registered this important law, but had not 
interpreted it”. An acceptable “interpretation” of this identity requires 
recognizing that one and “the same quality of a body expresses itself, 
according to circumstances, as ‘inertia’ or as ‘weight’ ” (Einstein 
1917/1997, 40). And elsewhere: “It is...clear that science is fully 
justified in assigning such a numerical equality only after this 
numerical equality is reduced to an equality of the real nature of the 
two concepts” (1922/2002, 56–7). 
  
y-axis in the negative direction.4  The second frame is non-inertial, for 
it accelerates in the y-direction at the rate γ, but has zero acceleration 
along the other axes. The equations of motion for an observer at rest 
with respect to the second frame “are the same equations that describe 
motion in the [homogenous] gravitational field. We can thus say: [the 
second frame of reference] is at rest, but a gravitational field is present. 
We need only set g=-γ. Through this conception, the essential 
difference between inertial and heavy mass is taken away” (1919, I.6).  
How should one interpret the physical meaning of the equality g=-
γ?  In Reichenbach’s notebook, there is a diagram of the two frames. 
Parallel to the y-axis in each, there is a drawing of a spring. Beneath the 
drawing, Reichenbach has written: “From the point of view of [the 
second frame of reference]: the tension of the spring arises through 
gravitational mass. From the point of view of [the first frame of 
reference], one judges: The tension of the spring arises through the 
inertial resistance of the body, through inertial mass. The same effect, 
in one case from inertial mass, in the other case from gravitational 
mass,” (1919, I.6) but it is interpreted differently in different frames of 
reference. 
                                                
4A gravitational field (in a space) assigns to every point in the space 
a gravitational vector; this vector is interpreted physically as the 
instantaneous acceleration experienced by a test particle at that point in 
the space. A gravitational field is homogeneous if and only if the same 
vector is assigned to every point in the space; obviously, the 
gravitational fields in the vicinity of the sun, the earth, or any other 
body are not homogeneous. 
  
The parallel with the 1905 inference is close to the surface. If the 
magnet is regarded as resting, then an electromotive force arises in the 
conductor; while if the conductor is regarded as resting, then an 
electrical field arises around the magnet. In either case, we observe the 
same value of the electrical current. Similarly, in the general relativistic 
case, if the system is considered to be in motion (constant acceleration) 
in a gravitation-free region, then the spring experiences inertial 
resistance; while if the system is considered to be at rest in a uniform 
gravitational field, then the spring experiences weight due to gravity. In 
both cases, a spring-based scale would measure the same force. Given 
the meter reading for the spring, we can explain this reading by 
positing an inertial force acting on it (the scale is accelerating in a 
gravitation-free region), or a gravitational force acting on it (the scale is 
at rest in a uniform gravitational field). One could accept this 
underdetermination at face value and respond with agnosticism, 
holding that one or the other description is correct even though we 
limited beings cannot say which. Einstein does not respond in this way. 
Rather, he concludes that the two forces are in fact ‘essentially’ the 
same, so that there is no real difference between an accelerated spring 
in a space free of gravitational forces and a spring at rest in a 
homogeneous gravitational field. 
The difference between Einstein’s two cases stems from the 
difference between the special theory, which maintains the notion of a 
privileged set of inertial frameworks, and the general theory, which 
attempts to do without such structures. The constant velocity of the 
1905 paper is replaced by constant acceleration later. But both of these 
arguments pose would-be underdetermination scenarios between two 
  
descriptions, but defuse the underdetermination by way of the identical 
rivals response. 
3  Ontology and the examples 
The previous section illustrated two instances of the identical rivals 
response. They are sufficient to show that the identical rivals response 
is at least sometimes, if not always, appropriate—at least for 
philosophers of science who consider Einstein’s arguments to be good.  
Nevertheless, both go beyond the identical rivals response as we 
originally posed it. The trivial case was when we imagined the same 
theory in French and in German (or in metric and imperial units of 
measure, or in Cartesian and polar coördinates)— suppose, for the sake 
of concreteness, that we have contemporary biochemistry in two 
languages. The theories talk about a great many unobservable things, 
like amino acids, enzymes, and so on, as well as their many properties 
and relations. When we make the identical rivals response, we accept 
each of the theories. We accept that there really are amino acids and 
whatnot. For present purposes, it does not matter if this is the practical 
acceptance of a constructive empiricist or the belief of a realist. What 
matters is that the two theories are understood as positing a rich 
ontology of unobservable stuff. We accept the ontologies of the two 
theories at face value, and— as part of the identical rivals response— 
we insist that the two ontologies are the same. 
The two non-trivial examples are importantly different than this. 
Consider Einstein’s first argument. If we treat the two representations 
as making claims about absolute motion and absolute rest, then 
certainly they disagree. Moreover— since there is no absolute 
  
motion— neither description is true.5  It is crucial that Einstein does not 
treat them in this way. He is only able to treat them as different 
descriptions of the same situation because he prunes their ontological 
commitments. There is no absolute motion, only relative motion. 
Einstein’s second argument is similar. In employing the identical rivals 
response, he prunes any difference between constant acceleration and 
gravitation from his ontology. The distinctions drawn in the earlier 
theories are merely verbal distinctions without a difference.  
So each extended example of the identical rivals response involves 
some ontological parsimony; that is, it involves eliminating some of the 
things that naïvely seem to be posited by the two theory formulations. 
Yet, as the trival examples are sufficient to show, the identical rivals 
response is not of necessity eliminativist. So is this just an accidental 
feature of the examples from Einstein that we’ve discussed?  We argue 
that it is not. The identical rivals response, except in trivial cases (such 
as French-German and metric-imperial), requires ontological 
parsimony.  
In the next section, we attempt to deliver on this claim. 
4  General arguments 
Our approach in this section begins with a sort of antinomy: An 
argument by John Norton purports to show that (to put it in our 
                                                
5One might say that they are false, or that they lack truth-values 
because of presupposition failure or some other semantic problems. But 
false and truth-valueless theories are both unacceptable, so this 
difference is unimportant here. 
  
terminology) the identical rivals response is presumptively appropriate 
whenever we seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories. At 
the other extreme, an argument by Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin 
purports to show that there could never be empirically equivalent 
theories. A consequence of the latter argument is that whenever we 
seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories we must be 
mistaken; as such, the identical rivals response would never be 
appropriate. So these arguments seem to reach incompatible 
conclusions. This antinomy is resolved by explicitly acknowledging the 
rôle of ontological parsimony in applications of the identical rivals 
response. Before arguing for this, we should explain the two 
arguments. 
THESIS: Anytime we are faced with apparent underdetermination, 
the identical rivals response is probably appropriate.  To give the 
argument for the thesis briefly:  
Suppose we have two theories which are demonstrated to have the 
same observational consequences. 
Since the observational consequences can be reasoned about in this 
way, there must be some tractable description of them. If the 
observational consequences of a theory can be described compactly 
without recourse to the non-observable posits of the theory, then the 
posits are otiose. So we may presume this not to be possible. There are 
descriptions of the observational consequences of each theory that 
make essential use of the central theoretical terms of that theory. 
There are three possibilities: Either the theoretical structures of the 
two theories are utterly distinct, one theory has surplus structure, or 
they are interconvertible without loss. 
  
(1) The theoretical structure of each theory is what systematizes its 
observational consequences. As such, the demonstration that the 
theories have the same observational consequences must have 
exploited some similarity between the theoretical structures of the two 
theories. So we may conclude that the two theories do not have utterly 
different theoretical structures. 
(2) If one theory has surplus structure, then— since the rival theory 
produces the same observational consequences without the surplus— 
the structure must be inessential for generating observational 
consequences. These are otiose. They are (as Norton says) “strong 
candidates for being superfluous, unphysical structures” (2008, 35). 
(3) If the theoretical structures are interconvertible without loss, 
then we should think that the two theories are really just saying the 
same thing. 
Since the third possibility is the most likely, we have a strong 
reason to think that the two are merely different formulations of the 
same theory.  
Norton puts the conclusion of the argument this way: “[P]airs of 
theories that can be demonstrated to be observationally equivalent are 
very strong candidates for being variant formulations of the same 
theory” (2008, 35). As we would put the point: The identical rivals 
response is probably appropriate for any case in which the theories can 
be proven to have the same observational consequences. 
Norton’s formulation of the argument is somewhat weaker than 
what we have in mind. It “is specifically restricted to those [theories] 
whose observational equivalence can be demonstrated in the sort of 
compact argumentation that can appear in a paper in the philosophy of 
  
science literature” (2008, 33). And there may be be a gap between a 
case being a “very strong candidate” for the identical rivals response 
(as Norton says) and the response’s being probably appropriate. 
Regardless, the same argument form can be re-deployed to yield the 
conclusion that the identical rivals response should be the presumptive 
reaction to empirically equivalent theories, and we will refer to this as 
‘Norton’s argument’ below. 
Norton’s argument raises several issues, but we wish to concentrate 
on his answer to the second possibility: one of the theories has surplus 
structure that is not essential for producing the theory’s observational 
consequences. Toy examples of this kind are easy to produce. Let one 
theory be standard particle physics, and let another theory be standard 
particle physics plus the posit that there is an undetectable dragon in 
my garage. Of course the observational consequences of these two 
theories are the same, and one cannot argue on the basis of observation 
that there is no dragon. Yet it is tempting to treat the dragon not as an 
actual posit of the second theory, treating it instead as “superfluous” 
and “unphysical.” 
However, refusing to treat dragons as a serious posit of the second 
theory is not entirely innocent. Imagine that a century from now there 
is a technique for detecting previously undetectable dragons. Future 
scientists might come to the place where my garage once stood, turn on 
their dragonometers, and decide between these two theories. The 
invisible dragon would not be superfluous or unphysical after all. 
Returning to the more realistic cases of relativistic physics, it could 
turn out that future scientific generations will find good reasons to posit 
absolute velocities or to distinguish inertial effects from gravitational 
  
ones. For example, Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics 
requires absolute velocity. If Bohmian mechanics is eventually 
accepted, then what Einstein considered surplus structure in classical 
electrodynamics will once again play an important theoretical role. 
Similarly, if future technological developments allow for more precise 
versions of Eötvös’s experiments to be carried out, then it is 
conceivable that inertial and gravitational forces will need to be pulled 
apart again, overturning Einstein’s identification of them in the 
principle of equivalence; see, e.g., Einstein  (1922/2002, 316.) The 
generality of the considerations raised in this paragraph suggest: 
ANTITHESIS:When faced with apparent underdetermination, the 
identical rivals response is never appropriate.  Laudan and Leplin 
(1991) argue that, in general, there cannot be logically distinct6  but 
empirically equivalent theories. Their reasoning is similar to that of the 
previous paragraph. To summarize briefly:  
The boundaries of the observable are historically variable; 
similarly, the auxiliary hypotheses that scientists employ in making 
predictions are historically variable. So take two theories that only 
disagree about matters that are now unobservable. We cannot rule out 
the possibility that at some time in the future we will develop a way to 
                                                
6Depending on how theories are individuated, this should perhaps 
be ‘...metaphysically distinct...’ For the terms ‘inertial mass’ and 
‘gravitational mass’ are not logically identical, even for Einstein— 
however, they are necessarily or ‘essentially’ identical for Einstein: a 
sentence of the form ∀x(Px≡Qx) is not a logical truth, but it can be true 
in all possible worlds for certain values of P and Q. 
  
observe the relevant differences; similarly, scientists might learn 
previously unknown auxiliary laws which connect the previously 
unobservable differences with observable consequences. As such, we 
cannot say of two such theories that they are empirically equivalent.  
In the face of any putative underdetermination, we should deny that 
the rivals are empirically equivalent. This precludes employing the 
identical rivals response, because if they are the same theory then there 
cannot be any empirical difference between them. 
If the supposition required at the outset of Norton’s argument were 
timeless empirical equivalence with no logical possibility of 
observational discrimination, then Laudan and Leplin’s argument 
would suffice to show the untenability of Norton’s thesis: even though 
two theories may appear observationally equivalent given today’s state 
of the art, tomorrow’s unforeseeable new discoveries may overturn this 
apparent equivalence. However, Norton’s argument need not suppose 
anything so strong. Distinct theories can have the same observational 
consequences, given background assumptions about observability.7  For 
the purpose of Norton’s argument, we can treat physics-cum-dragon 
and physics-sans-dragon as having the same observational 
consequences, because we presume as tacit background knowledge that 
nothing remotely like a dragonometer exists. Dragonometers, as a very 
remote possibility, can reasonably be set aside as science fiction. On a 
charitable interpretation, Norton’s argument would take the actual 
physical posits of the two theories as probably identical. If the 
                                                
7Of course, as Laudan and Leplin note, such assumptions are linked 
to auxiliary hypotheses that are themselves historically variable. 
  
‘dragons’ mentioned in on formulation are un-physical posits, then 
there is no possibility of their detection. 
Refusing Norton’s suggestion and insisting that the dragons might 
one day be observable would require a literal reading of the dragon 
ontology, but parallel scruples would undo the Einsteinian examples 
(from §2.) Consider Einstein’s argument that opens the 1905 special 
relativity paper. Just as we can imagine dragonometers, we can imagine 
übergyroscopes that could tell the difference between real motion and 
absolute rest, and thereby decide which of the two empirically 
equivalent descriptions is the true one.8  Or as mentioned above, 
Bohmian mechanics, which requires bodies to have absolute velocities, 
could eventually be accepted. If there were an ontological difference 
between moving the magnet and moving the conductor, then there 
might in principle be some way to distinguish between the two. If one 
accepts Laudan and Leplin’s argument, then the situation (in Einstein’s 
1905 argument) in which the magnet is at rest would not be empirically 
equivalent to the situation in which the magnet is in motion— because 
imaginable devices and theories could tease them apart. However, the 
two competing claims are still underdetermined, in the sense that we 
cannot responsibly decide between them, since we have no 
übergyroscope.9  Similar considerations apply to differentiating inertial 
                                                
8Indeed, responding to van Fraassen’s discussion of absolute space, 
Laudan and Leplin imagine discoveries that are tantamount to an 
übergyroscope  (1991, 458). 
9Although ‘underdetermination’ and ‘empirical equivalence’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably, this case would seem 
  
mass and gravitational mass. If one follows Laudan and Leplin, then 
our inability to pull these apart would be merely a brute fact, an 
observed ‘numerical equality,’ as opposed to an ‘essential equality.’ 
They offer a version of what we earlier called the ‘gnostic’ response to 
apparent underdetermination— provided such fantastic devices, we 
could decide between the theories— but the two examples from 
Einstein show that the gnostic response is not always appropriate. 
Bohmian mechanics and an übergyroscope both presuppose that 
there is an absolute difference between motion and rest; they take the 
ontologies of the two descriptions to be thoroughly physical, as 
opposed to ‘unempirical’ or ‘superfluous.’ The identical rivals response 
proposes instead that there is no such thing as absolute rest, so there is 
obviously no possible device for detecting it. Switching to Einstein’s 
argument for the principle of equivalence, the identical rivals response 
is only appropriate because the “numerical equality” of gravitational 
and inertial mass is replaced with identity— what Einstein might have 
called ‘essential equality.’ The plausibility of Einstein’s eliminativist 
ontology is the very reason that his identical rival responses are not 
undone by Laudan and Leplin’s considerations. Because the 
alternatives describe the same situation, they are logically (or at least 
metaphysically) equivalent and so necessarily empirically equivalent. If 
the eliminativist ontology is correct, there is no possible future 
development that could make them yield different predictions. 
                                                                                                                
underdetermined even though the theories would not be empirically 
equivalent. For another such case, see Magnus (2005b). 
  
Returning to Norton’s argument, his answer to the second 
possibility is crucial. Ontological parsimony—refusing to take the 
excess structure as physical—rules out the possibility that the excess 
part will generate detectable differences as science advances. It is 
important to note that this eliminativist move is typically a crucial part 
of deploying the identical rivals response. We treat undetectable 
dragons as superfluous because the rest of science directs us to dismiss 
squamous phantoms. Yet we are fallibilists, and we recognize that we 
might be wrong; so we cannot banish dragons completely— dragons 
and absolute velocities remain (in a weak sense) epistemically possible. 
If scientists in a century develop dragonometers or übergyroscopes, our 
parsimonious ontology and identical rivals response will prove wrong 
in retrospect. Norton’s argument only yields the conclusion that surplus 
structures are ‘candidates’ for occamizing; any two theories with the 
same observational consequences are candidates for the identical rivals 
response. Whether the identical rivals response should be elevated from 
mere candidacy to full adoption depends crucially on whether there is 
good evidence for ontological parsimony. 
Here is another way of making the same basic point. Parties on both 
sides of the antinomy can accept the conditional ‘If two theories are 
truly empirically equivalent, then they are identical simpliciter.’ The 
thesis (Norton’s conclusion) follows from accepting the antecedent 
and, by modus ponens, deriving identity. The antithesis (Laudan and 
Leplin’s conclusion) follows from rejecting the consequent and, by 
modus tollens, deriving their empirical inequivalence. We have 
attempted to show in this section that both modus ponens and modus 
tollens, as uniform policies, would be rash when facing apparent cases 
of underdetermination. The success of Einstein’s gambits shows that 
  
Laudan and Leplin’s modus tollens view is too strong, while Laudan 
and Leplin’s plausible point concerning the variability of auxiliary 
hypotheses, and resultant variability of what is observable, shows that 
modus ponens would be too strong. An important reason why uniform 
modus ponens and uniform modus tollens are both too extreme is that 
the identical rivals response typically involves (in realistic cases) 
ontological eliminativism, and there is simply no rule to always 
eliminate or never eliminate—or even a default rule to eliminate or not. 
As philosophers should be well aware from debates over several 
specific eliminativist proposals, the evidential situation pro or contra 
elimination is usually rather subtle and complex. 
5  Two conditions, but no rule 
The discussion so far shows that the identical rivals response is 
sometimes appropriate but cannot necessarily be applied to all cases of 
apparent underdetermination. Applying it is not simply a matter of 
inspecting the meanings of the would-be rival theories. It is usually a 
matter of deciding how to understand them: treat the differences as 
substantive physical disagreement, or treat the differences as merely 
verbal. We strongly suspect that there is no determinate algorithm for 
this decision. We can never with absolute certainty rule out the 
possibility that future auxiliary theories might change the observable 
consequences of the theories, making today’s superfluous content into 
tomorrow’s well-confirmed posit. The point here is not just that such 
an outcome is logically possible. The Laudan-Leplin worries can 
always be formulated so long as the two rival theories are treated as 
genuinely distinct. As such, whether the would-be rivals are merely 
variant formulations of the same theory cannot be known with 
  
certainty. Despite the reasonable doubts raised by the Laudan-Leplin 
arguments, the two examples from Einstein are sufficient to show that 
the identical rivals response is sometimes appropriate. 
Even though there is no algorithm, we want to suggest two kinds of 
considerations that are relevant to this decision. 
5.1  The future discriminability condition 
The identical rivals response is ultimately untenable if future 
developments will allow for scientists to observationally distinguish 
between the rival theories. If future technology can detect absolute 
motion, then it is a mistake even now to treat the disagreements about 
absolute motion as merely verbal differences. Conversely, the identical 
rivals response is tenable if such future developments will not occur. 
Call this the future discriminability condition, because it is not directly 
available to deliberation in the present moment. It is always a matter of 
whether future possibilities will be realized or not. 
However, there can be directly available evidence for or against the 
future development of observable differences. Before the first neutrino 
detectors, it would have been rash to trim them presumptively from our 
ontology; scientists reasonably expected that it would eventually be 
possible to detect neutrinos, as technology advanced. In cases like 
these, it is inappropriate to apply the identical rivals response.10  Such 
                                                
10This position does not beg the question of realism against the 
constructive empiricist. By ruling out the identical rivals response in 
such cases, we are only insisting that the theories should be understood 
to actually posit ultrasonic vibrations and neutrinos. The realist and the 
  
cases contrast with e.g. absolute velocity, whose inaccessibility to our 
senses has nothing to do with its being too small for our visual system 
to detect. No matter how powerful our microscopes become, detecting 
absolute velocity will not become any easier. It would require an 
instrument that works in utterly novel ways, instead of simply 
extending our already-existing discriminatory powers. So the identical 
rivals response is more defensible here than in the case of neutrinos. 
5.2  The heuristic utility condition 
Independently, surplus structure may serve a useful heuristic rôle. 
Fundamental particles are often posited first only for systematic and 
theoretical reasons. They may be treated as genuine physical posits of 
the theory for some time before techniques are developed for actually 
observing them. Call this the heuristic utility condition: The identical 
rivals response is inappropriate when the peculiar posits of a theory are 
heuristically useful and guide scientists in developing the theory.  
Conversely, the response is appropriate when the posits serve no useful 
heuristic role. 
A posit might be heuristically useful in this way even if it never 
makes an observable difference. Even if a particle theory is revised 
before techniques to observe the particle are developed, taking the posit 
seriously could be crucial for developing the theory; descendants of the 
theory may be ultimately confirmed. 
                                                                                                                
constructive empiricist agree on that much, and we leave them to argue 
over whether we should believe in the posits or merely accept as 
empirically adequate the theory that posits them. 
  
In the remainder of the section, we consider two examples in which 
the internal condition plays a prominent rôle: quantum mechanics in 
1926 and the indeterminacy of translation. 
In the mid-1920s, Erwin Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and 
Werner Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics could have seemed like rival 
theories. In wave mechanics, the state of the system changed with time 
and the operators were time independent. In matrix mechanics, 
conversely, the state was time independent and the operators were time 
dependent. Nevertheless, any predictions of either would require both 
the state and an operator, and the predictions of each were (in general) 
time dependent. So it was natural to think that the disagreement is one 
about where to write the variable t, rather than a substantive 
disagreement about the world. Indeed, following papers by Schrödinger 
and Carl Eckart in 1926, physicists came to treat wave and matrix 
formulations of quantum mechanics as different formalisms for the 
same theory. As we would put it, they applied the identical rivals 
response. 
Yet, as Muller (1997) has shown, Schrödinger’s arguments were 
insufficient to show that the two were equivalent. Wave and matrix 
mechanics did not even have the same observational consequences at 
that time!  So the two could not have been formulations of the same 
theory. Nevertheless, treating them as if they were was fruitful for 
physicists. What we are calling the internal condition— heuristic 
fruitfulness— vindicates the choice. Less than a decade later, von 
Neumann was able to represent the two approaches in terms of Hilbert 
spaces. Even though the theories were different in their details in 1926, 
  
successors of the two theories were just different expressions of a more 
general formalism. 
In this case, as with the other cases we have considered, the 
identical rivals response involved ontological streamlining. 
Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics described unobserved 
particles as fluctuating bits of jiggly matter; in Muller’s phrase, “tiny 
jelly-like lumps of vibrating charged matter” (1997, 229). Treating 
wave mechanics as equivalent to the antimetaphyscial matrix 
mechanics meant treating these waves as unphysical. 
Consider a different example: Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy 
of translation is a reaction to a putative underdetermination scenario.11  
Quine asks us to imagine two linguists working independently to 
translate the totally foreign Jungle language. Each creates a manual for 
translating between Jungle and English. The two might create manuals 
which prove equally serviceable in interactions between Jungle 
speakers and English speakers but which nevertheless disagree about 
which Jungle words correspond to which English words. “[T]he thesis 
of indeterminacy of translation” is that the two “manuals might be 
indistinguishable in terms of any native behavior that they gave reason 
to expect, and yet each manual might prescribe some translations that 
                                                
11Quine himself recognizes differences between the ‘standard’ 
underdetermination of theory by evidence in the sciences and his 
radical translation scenario. “The indeterminacy of translation is not 
just an instance of the empirically underdetermined character of 
physics” (1970, 180). We are not concerned here with the nitty-gritty of 
Quine exegesis. 
  
the other translator would reject.” (1987, 8). Considered as theories 
about the meanings of words in Jungle, the two translation manuals are 
empirically equivalent but incompatible theories. 
This putative case of underdetermination might be met in any of the 
four general ways that we discussed in the introduction. If we took the 
agnostic route, we would infer that the existence of the two translation 
manuals shows that we English speakers cannot know which 
translation of a given utterance in Jungle provides the true meaning of 
that utterance. 
Quine instead gives the identical rivals response: The existence of 
alternative translation manuals shows not that we should suspend 
judgment on which is the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ translation, but rather that 
neither is the one true or correct translation. As Quine says:  
The problem is not one of hidden facts. …The question whether 
…the foreigner really believes A [the translation according to the first 
manual] or believes rather B [the second manual’s translation], is a 
question whose very significance I would put into doubt. (Quine 1970, 
pp.180-181)  
Although the two manuals seem to disagree about the meaning of 
Jungle words and sentences, this appearance results only from thinking 
that the two manuals are theories about traditional (i.e. extra-
behavioral) meanings of words or sentences. Quine defuses the would-
be underdetermination by suggesting that there is no such thing as the 
traditional meaning of a sentence in isolation, just as Einstein 
concluded in 1905 that there is no such thing as absolute velocity. 
Different manuals are analogous to different inertial frames of 
reference. 
  
If one is going to resist the Quinean deflation of meaning, it will 
not be by invoking the future discrimination condition. No one 
imagines that future linguists will be able to construct meaning-o-
meters that determine which translation manual gives the true meanings 
of the words. Rather, it must be that there is some theoretical advantage 
to positing meanings. Katz (1967; 1997), for example, argues that such 
a theoretical advantage exists— that there is a systematic reason 
internal to linguistics or semantics for positing meanings. 
This is a further illustration of the kind of consideration we have in 
mind with the heuristic utility condition: If there is no heuristic or 
theoretical advantage of one translation manual over the other, then 
there seems no ground left for resisting the identical rivals response. 
6  Conclusion 
We have argued for two general conclusions regarding the identical 
rivals response in actual scientific cases: First, it goes along with 
deflating the ontology of one or both theory formulations. The would-
be rivals are made to agree because the points on which they could 
disagree are taken to be merely verbal differences. Second, the 
identical rivals response is never necessitated by the situation itself. It 
is, rather, a decision under uncertainty. It is a strategic choice about 
how to respond to apparent underdetermination. 
In the previous section, we suggested two conditions which ought 
to influence this strategic choice. The future discriminability condition 
suggests that one should not apply the identical rivals response if there 
is evidence that future observations will allow you to detect effects of 
the posits about which the theories seem to disagree. The heuristic 
  
utility condition states: Don’t apply the identical rivals response if the 
extra features of one formulation provide extra heuristic or theoretical 
resources for developing the theory. (Although this formulates the 
conditions as negative ones, we do not mean to suggest that they 
merely operate as roadblocks to the presumptive application of the 
identical rivals response. The conditions could be worded postively, in 
terms of when the response ought to be applied.) 
Note that applying the external condition depends on our 
background knowledge. Note also that the internal condition depends 
on our present theoretical context; whether something is fruitful or 
heuristically useful depends on what else we have to work with. As 
such, both of these conditions depend on time and context. 
Even acknowledging that Einstein was right to apply the identical 
rivals response and treat absolute velocity as an unphysical posit, it 
does not follow that the response would have been appropriate earlier. 
For Newton, absolute velocity played an important rôle. He could not 
see how mechanics could proceed without it,12 so what we have called 
the future discriminability condition might have justified his rejecting 
Einstein’s arguments (if, anachronistically, he had considered them). In 
the mid-nineteenth century, scientists might reasonably have hoped that 
the ether would provide a medium in which to measure the Earth’s 
absolute velocity; the heuristic utility condition would have justified 
their rejecting Einstein’s arguments (again, if they had 
                                                
12 See especially Newton’s unpublished manuscript De 
Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum (1962, II.1; in particular 129-
131). 
  
anachronistically considered them). It is hard to say when the time was 
right for Einstein’s arguments, but certainly it had arrived by the time 
he proposed them. 
This only seems shocking if we imagine that applying the identical 
rivals response is like intuiting a timeless essence. Yet it is not as if 
Einstein had peered into the Form of each state description and 
recognized them to be the same. Einstein made a scientific argument, 
situated in the scientific and evidential context of his time. Applying 
the identical rivals response was appropriate only given the background 
knowledge and theories of the time. And so it is in any case. 
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